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What’s the Story? 
Transitional Justice and the Creation 
of Historical Narratives in Croatia and Serbia
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Summary
Fifteen years after the end of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, discourses 
about the present and future are based upon revised and reconstructed narra-
tives about the past. Therefore, the relationships between transitional justice, 
political ideologies and historical narratives are still contested and vague. Re-
cent history in Serbia and Croatia is determined more by each nationality’s 
collective emotional memory than by common factual history.
This paper analyses the impact transitional justice mechanisms have on his-
torical narratives and the creation of collective memory about the war. As the 
“existing empirical knowledge about the impacts of transitional justice is still 
limited”, its influence on local societies is measured through its impact on 
political ideologies and historical narratives triggered by war crime trials. So 
far, in Serbia and Croatia the main transitional justice tool has been the pro-
secution of war crimes. We argue that transitional justice, instead of trigger-
ing truth seeking and truth telling processes that would lead to reconciliation, 
multiplied mutually exclusive historical narratives that determined national 
collective identities. 
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Introduction
Twenty years after the break up of Yugoslavia, relationships between political ideo-
logies and narratives about the past in Serbia1 and Croatia are still contested and 
vague. Once the common socialist narrative banning everything that could question 
* Ana Ljubojević, PhD candidate at IMT Institute for Advanced Studies in Lucca, Italy. 
1 At the beginning of domestic trials for war crimes Serbia was still part of Serbia and Montene-
gro. We will use the name Serbia throughout the paper in order to facilitate the reading. 
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the then proclaimed ideology of brotherhood and unity was discarded, the new suc-
cessor countries had to challenge and re-invent their own national traditions.
Recent history in Serbia and Croatia is determined more by each nationality’s 
collective emotional memory than by common factual history. Mutually exclusive 
“truths” about war and the atrocities committed quickly developed, and were used 
by political elites and mass media in the creation of new national narratives, rein-
forcing at the same time the fragmentation of post-war societies.
This paper analyses the impact transitional justice mechanisms have on histori-
cal narratives and the creation of collective memory about the war. As the “exist-
ing empirical knowledge about the impacts of transitional justice is still limited” 
(Freeman, 2006), its influence on local societies is measured through its impact on 
political ideologies and historical narratives triggered by war crime trials. So far, 
in Serbia and Croatia, the main transitional justice tool has been the prosecution of 
war crimes. The rationale behind such choice was that transition towards a stable 
democracy and strengthening of the rule of law in all post-Yugoslav states was not 
possible without justice and accountability for the committed crimes.
Assuming that in contemporary societies media have considerable power in 
informing public knowledge about history and shared historical narrative, we ana-
lyse local media reports on domestic war crime trials. Scholars like Peskin, Subotic, 
Akhavan, Orentlicher and others dealt with the impact that the international crimi-
nal tribunals had on the post-Yugoslav region and its transition towards democracy. 
Judicial intervention and compliance with international law, crucial for the trials be-
fore the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, are not the main 
focus when it comes to war crime trials in domestic, local courts. This paper ex-
plores different representations in the media of historical narratives established by 
local courts in Serbia in the Ovčara trial, and subsequently compares them to back-
ground, non-legal elements, i.e. historical context, command structure, description 
of the events or historical facts found in judgements rendered at the ICTY. 
How can we then explain state behaviour and strategies for dealing with the past 
presented at local courts for war crimes? Unlike the conditionality strategy applied 
for the state’s cooperation with the ICTY, trials for war crimes at the local level are 
not associated with imminent push factors such as the EU membership perspective. 
Therefore, various theories created around the impact of international tribunals or 
local political elites just cannot stand in this situation. This research analyses chan-
ges over time in media narratives. How and why those changes occur and what 
might be possible ways to tackle this problem in the larger context of global justice 
cascade? There is continuous development in the way legal heritage is discussed and 
remembered. According to Osiel, trials are significant if they comprise the poten-
tial to trigger a public debate about past wrongdoings and society’s wounds (Osiel, 
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1997). Hence, what is the influence of a legal narrative on the creation of political 
ideologies and remembrance of war?
Political ideologies in Croatia and Serbia rely greatly on mutually contested 
historical master narratives about the nature of the wars from the 1990s. Never-
theless, judicial processes do not deal with the causes of war itself but with jus ad 
bellum aspects. Therefore legal documents describe only the context of war and 
represent historical material that is easily manipulated. In addition, the very un-
derstanding of the tribunals’ legacies is not necessarily fixed, but may change over 
time as the domestic perceptions of the past and the domestic politics of the present 
change. 
Theoretical Framework – Law and Literature
The theoretical framework for this research is Hegel’s work on the direct relation-
ship of historical narrative to law. Use is made of Hegel’s idea of the State as divi-
ded into three parts: 1) immediate actuality of the state as a self-dependent organ-
ism, or constitutional law; 2) relations among states in international Law; and 3) 
world history. History represents the world’s court of judgement; it is the “neces-
sary development, out of the concepts of mind’s freedom alone, of the moments of 
reason and so of the self-consciousness and freedom of mind” (Hegel, 1967). 
Taking Brooks and Gewirtz’s methodological approach, law is analysed not as 
a set of rules and policies, but as a source of “stories, explanations, performances, 
linguistic exchanges – as narratives and rhetoric” (Brooks & Gewirtz, 1998: 1). 
Furthermore, law is given a dimension of “cultural discourse through which social 
narratives are structured and suppressed” (Brooks & Gewirtz, 1998: 1). Thus, atten-
tion is given more to the actual facts than legal rules of procedure, and to the way 
language is used as much as the idea expressed. While shaping reality through lan-
guage, law uses distinctive linguistic methods, forms and expressions and requires 
strategies of interpretation. On trial, historical narrative is constantly questioned 
and challenged, so that “reality” is always divided into various versions of truth. 
The popularity of the law and narrative approach can be understood as “loss of faith 
in the idea of objective truth and the widespread embrace of ideas about the social 
construction of reality. Narrative, in other words, is seen as the social construction 
of reality” (Brooks & Gewirtz, 1998: 12). To sum up, law “brings together story, 
form, and power” (Brooks & Gewirtz, 1998: 1). 
This paper deals with legal and media discourses about war crime trials. The 
case study presented in this paper is the “Ovčara” trial held before the Special Court 
for War Crimes in Belgrade, Serbia for crimes committed at an agricultural farm 
near Vukovar, Croatia. We approached the problematique by analysing trial tran-
scripts and media reports about domestic war crime trials held in Serbia for the 
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Ovčara-Vukovar hospital case. Foucault’s definition of discourse being “practices 
that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (Foucault, 2002) is taken 
as the basis. Foucault conceptualises discourse analysis as “the understanding of 
rules and regularities in the creation/dispersal of objects, subjects, styles, concepts 
and strategic fields” (Foucault, 2002). For Foucault, the main subject of discur-
sive analysis is not the same as that of linguistic analysis, i.e. the rules in accord-
ance with which a particular statement has been made and rules in accordance with 
which other similar statements could be made; instead, he is concerned with “how 
is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?” (Foucault, 2002). 
Foucault’s works showed that discourse has a direct impact on social relations and 
power structures in society. Nevertheless, for the use of this research, his theory is 
very difficult to operationalise as it often seems too broad to apply to specific con-
texts. In this paper we use a narrower definition of discourse developed by critical 
discourse analysis theory, as our main focus is on the relationship between content 
and situational context in which observed documents are made. We observe the me-
dia’s “discursive strategies” (Van Dijk, 2009), i.e. their conscious or unconscious 
linguistic strategies used to establish, reproduce, transform or deconstruct the con-
tent of historical narrative present in war crime trials. 
Critical discourse analysis is based upon the assumption that language is dialec-
tically interconnected with other elements of social life. Legal heritage and memo-
ry are socially situated and developed from the interaction of law and its language 
with the society itself. Discourse analysis effectively shows how each discourse is 
produced, distributed and interpreted in a particular conjuncture. We take into ac-
count Norman Fairclough’s dialectic paradigm that understands discourse as both 
“socially constituted and socially constitutive” (Fairclough, 2003). The dissemina-
tion of media to wide parts of society enhances the constitutive effects of its shared 
discourses playing a significant role in the construction of social reality. Discourse 
is articulated within contextual structure, power and ideology in order to generate 
knowledge and belief. We follow the critical view of ideology as “representations of 
aspects of the world which can be shown to contribute to establishing, maintaining 
and changing social relations of power, domination and exploitation” (Fairclough, 
2003). This view contrasts various descriptive understandings of ideology as posi-
tions, attitudes, beliefs, perspectives etc. of social groups without reference to re-
lations of power and domination between such groups. Ideological representations 
constructed in the media after trial transcripts and legal documents are not used as 
an objective historical information reflecting “reality” but rather as a source for the 
analysis of ideological debates and constructing social reality in public spheres in 
Croatia and Serbia. 
We analyse the role of print media in the establishment of political memory 
of past wrongdoings. The media help substantively in the (re)creation of histori-
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cal narratives about the past war and they stand in line with ideological discourses. 
Media influence also the creation of collective memory, even though “there is still 
no default understanding of memory that includes journalism as one of its vital and 
critical agents” (Zelizer, 2008). Zelizer points out that journalism’s work on the past 
is often understood as more in line with the main historical discourse than with col-
lective memory. Nevertheless, “just what part of the past and what kind of future 
are brought into play depends on what editors and journalists believe legitimately 
belongs within the public domain, on journalistic conventions, and of course on per-
sonal ideologies” (Lang and Lang, 1989). The media’s work on memory is selective 
and strategic: “once journalists begin to make decisions about which stories play in 
which medium and using which tools for relay, they find themselves squarely in the 
realm of memory’s work (Zelizer, 2008). In addition, historical discourse offered by 
the media contributes in spreading a sense of shared history, as one of the main ele-
ments necessary to forge a collective identity and a sense of shared identity. 
Moreover, interests of political elites are expressed in proposed ways of deal-
ing with the past, in determining responsibility, silencing or insisting on the dis-
course about the nature of war and in punishing the perpetrators. This research 
analyses media reports in Serbia and Croatia and concentrates on representations of 
historical and judicial material. Gellner argued that the national sentiment that relies 
on the relation and the comparison with others would be politically more effective 
if nationalists had as fine a sensibility to the wrongs committed by their nation as 
they have to those committed against it (Gellner, 1983). On the other hand, Michal 
Billig’s work on banal nationalism shows how our national identity and homeland 
constitute the very core of everyday mass media content (Bilig, 2009). This re-
search tries to look at possible changes over time in media representations and per-
ceptions of war crime trials, especially regarding crimes committed by one’s own 
nationals. 
Selection of Memory Material
Legal narratives might be the main source of the memory of war, but they are subse-
quently shaped by media representations and interpretations. Selection in news pro-
duction and its interpretative structure of the courts’ activities, may lead to biased 
reports inherited from the period of dissolution of Yugoslavia. Edited information 
reflects certain relations of power: it differs in news reports made by media sup-
porting the official attitude of the state and its proposed main national ideology, or 
in relatively independent media. Both Croatian and Serbian media are estimated as 
“partially free” and connected with the state elites in a non-transparent way. There-
fore, relations of power and influence of party politics are very important factors 
that certainly have important effects on the creation of ideologies. In Serbia me-
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dia ownership is unknown in 18 out of 30 media analysed by The Anti-corruption 
Agency2 and state institutions have a clear economic influence on the work of me-
dia through different funding schemes. Croatia, on the other hand, has adopted very 
rigid legal norms in the past and thus suffers from a lack of pluralism. 
In order to describe which topics in media coverage are important to the public 
we rely on agenda-setting theory. This theory claims that the press and the media 
do not reflect reality, but filter and shape it. Shaw and McCombs theorised the in-
fluence of the media as not telling audiences what to think but what to think about. 
Furthermore, the media influence public policies by “establishing an information 
agenda ensuring information selectivity, limiting the view of the public of social 
and political realities, and giving an advantage and attracting attention to some is-
sues and diverting it from others” (Windhauser, 1977). Media articles are perform-
ing ideological work on the past as they are interpreting the past following present 
perspectives, usually omitting the historical meaning of past arguments and view-
points. In addition, media are translating legal documents into everyday language 
and therefore modifying and reconstructing the discourse content. 
Reports on war crime trials are not simply dialectically opposite on the axis of 
Serbian-Croatian media. The difference in reporting of state-owned, independent 
or media heavily supporting certain political parties spreads over the geographi-
cal borders of the two countries. In addition, there is an important change in tone 
while reporting on war crime trials held before the ICTY or at the local level. There-
fore, this research is based on a more nuanced analysis, while bearing in mind ex-
ternal trials held internationally before the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and domestic trials preformed simultaneously in Serbia 
and Croatia. While the ICTY indicted only high-ranking officials from military and 
political elites, domestic courts dealt with direct perpetrators. This research shows 
that the differences in legal proceedings have an impact on the way accountability 
and reckoning of crimes is represented within the interpretative framework that 
deals with the selection, omission, and preference of certain media material, i.e. the 
“news frame” (Gamson, 1991). 
Moreover, in some cases held at the local level, indictments themselves represent a 
choice of narrative to follow, notably when excluding middle-ranking officials from 
a list of alleged perpetrators. Thus, even though war crimes have been proved be-
fore the ICTY beyond any reasonable doubt, responsibility can be operated through 
a comprehensive legal mastering of the past. 
2 http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/Storage/Global/Documents/mediji/IZVESTAJ%20
O%20MEDIJIMA,%20PRECISCENA%20VERZIJA.pdf
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While historically war crimes were dealt with by executions or summary trials 
set up by victors after conflict or simply remained unpunished, they are now con-
sidered just like other crimes that demand a proper trial and due process. As there 
is “a misguided impulse to capture ineffable human suffering within the confines 
of the judicial process” (Akhavan, 2001), criminal trials for systematic violations 
of human rights rarely produce agreement. Mark Osiel stated that legal proceedings 
are actually founded on civil dissensus, given the discrepancy between widespread 
and organised political violence and individual guilt as the only mode of accusing 
perpetrators for the crimes committed. War crime trials are defendant-oriented with 
victims as tools in the pursuit of justice and therefore victims can very rarely reach 
the needed level of satisfaction with proceedings and judgements.
Legal processes before tribunals often neglect historical trajectories, and larger 
social and cultural forces, while focusing on proving individual guilt. One of the 
consequences of the described dissensus is precisely the process of attribution of 
collective guilt that relates post-war trauma and nationalist ideologies and creates 
greater social distances between ex-warring parties.
The transition towards stable democracy and strengthening of the rule of law in 
all post-Yugoslav states was deemed possible only if backed by transitional justice 
mechanisms and accountability for crimes committed. Accountability cannot be un-
derstood and reduced only to trial and punishment, nor is it permissive of blanket 
amnesties. While war crimes remained barbaric acts, criminal justice mechanisms 
are constantly developing. Trials concentrate on defining the facts that can lead to 
eventual accountability of the accused for very specific crimes; they do not describe 
the historical causes of war itself. 
Law and History
What is the impact of legal narratives on historical records in post-conflict societies 
in Serbia and Croatia? According to the “expressive theory of law”, law’s meaning 
can have significant consequences in shaping social norms. Legal actions, from the 
Durkheimian point of view, are particular rituals per se, they also mean, symbol-
ise or express the conscience collective. Thus, the legal impacts greatly affect the 
creation of collective memory after mass atrocities, as they involve highly effective 
rituals. Legal material directly influences collective memory, but in a very selective 
way. Judicial truth is often quite different from the official historical narrative. The 
notion of truth is related to the presentation of evidence in ritual practices and pub-
lic discourse. Unlike the proceedings before the ICTY, in both Serbia and Croatia 
there is no live coverage from the local courtrooms, which further narrows and 
shapes legal narratives, once they are transmitted by the media to the general public. 
This research analyses the specific use and/or misuse of certain keywords carrying 
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ideological connotations. Simultaneously, we emphasised strategies of “forgetful-
ness” and omission of parts of the narrative that could undermine some of the most 
widespread national ideologies. 
Halbwachs pointed out that our understanding of the past is influenced by 
present-day interests. Media representations are in fact “reading” history backwards 
and reflect at the same time power relations within society. Thus, to sum up, there 
is a two-level game going on: legal and political on one side, and doctrinal and his-
toriographical on the other. 
Many scholars argued that history should not be written in courts. Mark Osiel 
noted that the law is likely to discredit itself when it presumes to impose any answer 
to an interpretative question about the past. In addition, justice is “compromised be-
cause history occupies a central place in nationalist myth-making” (Wilson, 2005). 
Even more, in the region of the former Yugoslavia, wars in Croatia and Bosnia are 
deeply embedded in official narratives, up to the point of “civil religion” in Croatia 
in particular (Jović, 2009). Hannah Arendt argued that questions of great impor-
tance for the entire society, related primarily to the causes of conflicts, will be ne-
glected. The aim of this paper is not to judge whether “correct” historical accounts 
of past events are described in trials for war crimes, but how those findings are re-
presented in the media and consequently socially constructed.
War crime trials before domestic courts are important indicators of the politici-
zation of history set up during the nation-building project. For example, show trials, 
trials in absentia or those directed against members of paramilitary forces serve to 
manufacture the legitimacy of the state and to lift up the collective responsibility 
for the past crimes. Accordingly, criminal trials against direct perpetrators of no in-
terest for state institutions such as the army or police contribute to “removing from 
collective memory those larger social mechanisms that involve broader segments 
of the population in the establishment and execution of dictatorial regimes and their 
atrocities” (Edmunds, 2009).
Most transitional justice literature assumes that the movement for setting up ju-
dicial institutions dealing with past atrocities is internal, in the interest of the states 
willing to fulfil the transition towards democracy. The region of the former Yugo-
slavia is rather specific, as the first fair trials were triggered at the ICTY, an ad hoc 
tribunal founded by the UN Security Council. State collaboration with the tribunal 
was highly conditioned by different factors such as economic aid and European 
Union membership. This research deals with domestic trials for war crimes as they 
bare much less “judicial interventions” and make internal state strategies for deal-
ing with the past more visible. At the beginning of the work of the Special Court for 
War Crimes in Belgrade Bruno Vekarić, the deputy war crime prosecutor, outlined 
that “societies need to deal with the past not to appease the international community 
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but because of them”. Nevertheless, Peskin challenges the Kantian version of in-
ternational law founded in an idealized vision of human rights norms by explaining 
how international tribunals can cause domestic political crises and state instability. 
Both Serbia and Croatia encountered serious problems in enabling fair trials 
for war crimes before domestic courts. The major problem was, and still is, the low 
domestic demand for normative change and the high degree of politicization of the 
judiciary. For example, the Serbian public largely refused to believe that Serbs had 
committed war crimes, and they blamed other nations and ethnic groups for start-
ing the war. Some of the participants in recent wars, i.e. political elites, the church, 
elite intelligentsia, and the military, stayed in power after the transition and actively 
blocked transitional justice projects because of their own responsibility in creating, 
spreading and imposing old regime propaganda. Croatia institutionalized its official 
historical narrative about the Homeland War when in 2000 the Croatian Parliament 
approved a “Declaration on the Homeland War” as “just and legitimate defense” in 
order to “defend its internationally recognized borders against Greater Serbia’s ag-
gression”. 
Even when the institutional challenge such as local judicial capacity was met, 
judgements were put back on trial as in the case of “Ovčara” by the Serbian Su-
preme Court and none of the indictees was found guilty as in the “Lora” case by 
the Split district court. Moreover, trials were organized almost uniquely against di-
rect perpetrators, leaving a so-called “impunity gap” between high-ranking officials 
brought before the international tribunal and the lowest ranked alleged criminals. 
Thus, the state has a decisive role in proposing only certain, non-compromising 
parts of its history as official narrative to follow.
The “Ovčara” Trial 
On December 4th 2003, the War Crime Council of the Belgrade District Court3 is-
sued its first indictment against eight alleged perpetrators of war crimes committed 
in a farm building in Ovčara, close to Vukovar, Croatia. Based on documentation 
ceded to the Serbian Authorities by the ICTY, the indictment accused members of the 
Territorial defense of Vukovar (TO Vukovar) and the paramilitary formation “Leva 
Supoderica” of crimes against prisoners of war, according to the Third Geneva Con-
vention of 1949 on the Treatment of War Prisoners and Geneva Convention Annexed 
Protocol on Protection of Victims in Non-international Armed Conflicts. In particu-
lar, those indicted were accused of violence, murder, cruel treatment and torture, as 
well as outrages upon personal dignity, humiliating and degrading treatment. The 
3 After the judicial reform Belgrade District Court became High Court, therefore we will use 
hereinafter its commonly widespread name: Special Court for War Crimes.
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events described concern the execution of at least 200 war prisoners at Ovčara farm, 
transferred from Vukovar hospital to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) barracks. 
Almost simultaneously, in The Hague, before the ICTY, three former JNA 
high-ranking officers were tried for the same crimes. The indictment issued by the 
ICTY against Mrkšić, Radić and Šljivančanin4 describes events dating from the 
beginning of the siege of Vukovar in late August 1991, the fall of the city to Serb 
forces, the forced removal of about 400 non-Serbs from the Vukovar hospital and 
the killing of at least 264 Croats and other non-Serbs. JNA generals are accused of 
participation in a so-called Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) with the aim of perse-
cution of “Croats and other non-Serbs present at Vukovar hospital after the fall of 
the city, through the commission of murder, torture, cruel treatment, extermination 
and inhumane acts”. The international tribunal’s indictment also differs in the na-
ture of crimes and in criminal procedure undertaken in order to prove those crimes. 
Namely, the “Vukovar three” were accused of crimes against humanity and viola-
tions of the laws or customs of war according to the Statute of the ICTY; therefore 
victims are presumed to be also civilians and not only prisoners of war. More-
over, they are charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility and superior 
criminal responsibility, whereas the Serbian indictment deals only with direct exe-
cutors and thus prosecutes exclusively individual responsibility. The detainees were 
transferred to Ovčara from the JNA barracks, but the indictment issued by the War 
Crime Prosecutor in Belgrade did not include any of the events before the arrival at 
Ovčara farm, and accordingly did not question the responsibility of various army 
officers that allegedly agreed to render the prisoners to the TO and paramilitary 
forces. Consequently, such a selective indictment cleared a priori any involvement 
in the crime of state institutions such as the army or the military police. However, 
both the indictment and the judgement agree on the Vukovar TO and the paramili-
tary unit Leva Supoderica being components of the then JNA.
Punishment for the offence described by the Serbian indictment is regulated 
by Article 144 of the Criminal Code of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via (SFRY). Hence the rule of tempus regit actum, i.e. that the law that was in force 
at the time a criminal act was committed shall be applied to the perpetrator of the 
criminal act. Yet, when trying war crimes committed during the conflicts in the 
former Yugoslavia, as a general rule, the Serbian courts apply the 1993 FRY Crimi-
nal Code as the law more favourable to the accused. The reason behind this is that if 
after the perpetration of an act a less severe punishment is determined by law, such 
punishment shall be imposed. In the case of Article 144 (war crime against prison-
4 The initial indictment, confirmed on 7 November 1995, was later amended to include Slavko 
Dokmanović, mayor of wartime Vukovar. Following the death of the fourth indictee, the indict-
ment was changed three more times and was finalised on 15 November 2004.
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ers of war) of the SFRY Criminal Code, the maximum punishment was the death 
penalty, whereas in the FRY Criminal Code the maximum punishment was twenty 
years of imprisonment. 
Media Coverage of the Trial in Serbia and Croatia
Three domestic trials addressed by the War Crime Prosecutor’s Office in Belgrade 
for the war crimes committed at Ovčara farm near Vukovar have been resolved 
by final judgements. This research focuses on the case Ovčara I – Vujović et al., 
started before the Special Court for War Crimes in Belgrade on March 9th 2004. 
First instance judgement was rendered on December 12th 2005, but was reversed 
by the Serbian Supreme Court a year later and the case was put back on trial due to 
“procedural mistakes”. A new first-instance judgement was rendered by the District 
Court’s War Crimes Chamber on March 12th 2009. On September 14th 2010 the Ap-
pellate Court in Belgrade confirmed the first instance judgement.
The length of the trial as well as specific circumstances such as the opening 
trial for the newly founded Special Court and controversial decision of Supreme 
Court or even the simultaneity of the ICTY case on the Vukovar hospital secured 
relatively good media coverage in both Serbia and Croatia. In Serbia, differently 
from the reports concerning trials held before the ICTY, the tone of the articles de-
scribing the Ovčara case tried to get an impartial, almost indifferent quality. On the 
other hand, Croatian press mainly showed scepticism, as the case was processed in 
Serbia and not in the country where it was perpetrated, Croatia. Croatian media re-
mained victim-oriented, but at the same time insisted on the relationship of Ovčara 
crimes within the general frame of Serbian aggression led by JNA forces.
The choice of the indictment to bring charges against the alleged perpetrators 
for the criminal offence of war crimes against prisoners of war avoided discussion 
about the background situation in which the crime was committed. Instead, the case 
held before the ICTY brought charges for crimes against humanity. For persecutions 
on political, racial, and religious grounds, extermination, murder, torture, and inhu-
mane acts the court has to prove that the perpetrator has knowledge, either actual or 
constructive, that these acts were occurring on a widespread or systematic basis and 
does not commit his acts for purely personal motives completely unrelated to the at-
tack on the civilian population. Therefore the perpetrator must know that there is an 
attack on the civilian population, know that his act fits in with the attack and the act 
must not be taken for purely personal reasons unrelated to the armed conflict. The 
role of context is therefore crucial in trials of crimes against humanity. Nevertheless, 
the presence of official historical narratives about the causes of war could be noticed 
in sometimes free interpretation of legal material exposed in the courtroom. 
In Serbia, in 2003 there were about 70 newspaper articles dealing with the 
investigation process and later indictment for crimes committed at Ovčara. News 
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were usually short and regarded investigatory work before the indictment was is-
sued. Therefore, very often headlines are the main sources of information, as most 
of the newspapers used agency news in the articles’ text. All the accused were 
caught during the police operation “Sablja” in the immediate aftermath of ex Prime 
Minister Djindjić’s murder. Therefore, most of the articles depict the political will 
to deal with past atrocities, but at the same time recall constantly that the accused 
were members of paramilitary units or Serbs from Vukovar attached to the TO. 
Croatian media also paid little attention to the issue of the indictment. This is quite 
predictable, considering how unsuccessful were other attempts at coming to terms 
with the past, for example show trials set up throughout the region or the Truth 
Commission formed by the Government of Serbia and Montenegro in 2001 and 
which faded away in 2003. 
Once the start of the trial approached, it gained much more attention in the me-
dia. Serbian newspapers had headlines mostly related to the start of the trial, but also 
some of them underlined the fact that the accused were members of TO (for example 
Dnevnik – Eight accused for “Ovčara” from the TO Vukovar, Blic – The Duke sur-
rendered, Glas javnosti – Chetnik duke voluntarily at court), or that the crime has 
been committed (Večernje novosti – The injured were also executed, Večernje no-
vosti – 192 war prisoners killed, Danas – Guilty for murder of 192 war prisoners).
On March 10th 2009 many newspapers in Serbia cited the first defendant’s ini-
tial statement already in the title. Vujović accused some JNA officials of ordering 
the massacre and therefore triggered a debate about the role of the JNA and con-
sequently the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the war in Croatia: Balkan – De-
fendant demands the arrest of Aleksandar Vasiljević, ex chief of KOS (Counter-
intelligence service), Blic – General Vasiljević knows who ordered the massacre 
of civilians, Glas javnosti – General Vasiljević keeps the secret of Ovčara, Politika 
– Indictee accuses general Vasiljević. Others opted for the historical moment of 
the trial: Politika – Historical event for the judiciary, Politika – From Zvornik to 
Ovčara, Blic – Turning point for Serbia, Večernje novosti – Test for Belgrade, Da-
nas – History in the courtroom, Dnevnik – Ovčara trial – test for Serbian judiciary.
Croatian newspapers reported with great interest the beginning of the Belgrade 
trial. They concentrated on the fact that the victims were mostly Croatian nation-
als. Unlike the Serbian media who gave attention to the defendants’ statements, 
the Croatian ones looked first on the crime itself. On the visual plan there are also 
significant differences: while in Serbian papers the photos are depicting mostly the 
courtroom of the new modern tribunal the Serbian state should be proud of, the 
Croatian ones have chosen photos of the monuments in Vukovar or portraits of vic-
tims’ families. Main headlines announcing the beginning of the trial were: Jutarnji 
list – Death squad at Ovčara was killing Croats for seven hours, Večernji list – 50 
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witnesses to testify for Ovčara crimes, Vjesnik – Only Perić admitted killing of pri-
soners at Ovčara. 
As already mentioned in the introduction, this research is trying to operation-
alise how certain statements appear in the discourse, both legal and media. We ex-
plore the circumstances that made possible certain kinds of definitions regarding 
several key concepts present in war crime trials reporting in Serbia and Croatia: 1) 
number of victims; 2) who were the victims: prisoners of war, civilians or wounded; 
3) nation labelling; 4) the role of the JNA; 5) the use of history; 6) what happened 
in Vukovar beforehand? 
The indictment issued by the War Crime Prosecutor in Belgrade named at least 
192 victims (200 after amendment), differently from the ICTY one that based its 
case on 264 victims (around 60 are still treated as missing). Even though judicial 
truth differs from history or the official narrative about the war, some of the media, 
mostly Croatian5, insisted on the facts provided by The Hague tribunal. Numbers 
are particularly important when it comes to the penalties. On December 12th 2005 
the Special Court for War Crimes rendered judgement in the Ovčara case. Eight 
persons were sentenced to 20 years imprisonment (maximum penalty), three to 15, 
one to 12, one to 9 and one to 5 years. Two were released due to a lack of evidence. 
Večernji list highlights “Only a year for each killed at Ovčara” and “Murderers at 
Ovčara (punished) as for theft of mobile phone” (12/3/2007) and gives a short sur-
vey in which everybody asked for more severe punishments. Jutarnji list announces 
“20 years of imprisonment for the eight worst executors from Ovčara”, and Vjesnik 
also quotes “Criminals from Ovčara got from 5 to 20 years”. Serbian newspapers 
Glas javnosti, Danas, Blic, Politika, Dnevnik report mainly by stating the overall 
number of prison years, 231, which definitely makes the sentencing look severe and 
adequate. Večernje novosti and Kurir underline the maximum punishment. When in 
March 2009 the Special Court diminished punishments for some of the previously 
convicted war criminals, in Serbia only Politika daily reported that fact already in a 
headline. Belgrade’s strategy was again to announce the overall years of imprison-
ment for the crimes committed. The Croatian dailies remembered that the sentence 
was lighter and, even though the articles were shorter than a couple of years ago, 
assumed more emotional comments about “shame” (Večernji list), “difference be-
tween sentence and punishment” (Jutarnji list), “(ir)responsibility” (Vjesnik).
The second problem analysed in media material is the labelling of the victims. 
Croatian newspapers keep on underlining that nearly 200 victims were “Croats” 
or “Croatian prisoners” (Jutarnji list, Vjesnik, Glas Slavonije, Vukovarske novine), 
5 Glas Slavonije – Pokajnik Stuka imenovao zločince koji su 1991. strijeljali 260 Hrvata na 
Ovčari; Jutarnji list – Pokajnik s Ovčare [...] ispitivan o masakru 260 Hrvata pokraj Vukovara.
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whereas Večernji list calls them “defenders, civilians and wounded”. Only one ar-
ticle from Vukovarske novine ever mentioned “Croatian war prisoners”. This omis-
sion is very important as it is absolutely necessary in order to explain the indict-
ment. Moreover, this is precisely the point in which the ICTY and Special Court 
legal arguments differ. As for reports of the Serbian media the situation turns out to 
be more complex. Usually prisoners’ nationality is never mentioned, they are main-
ly labelled as “prisoners of war”. Danas varies largely in labelling the victims: it 
mentioned on March 9th 2004 that 192 members of Croatian army were killed, two 
days later that “prisoners of war, civilians and army members” were executed, and 
in 2005 calls them “civilians taken from Vukovar hospital”. Most alarming is the 
case of Politika that on March 11th 2004 analyses “the Croatian view point on trial” 
in the article entitled “Victims without nationality”. While the author claims that 
media outlined that the victims were “civilians, wounded and hospital staff”, main-
ly “Croats and other non-Serbs”, it comments that “this statement is partially true, 
because among the executed victims there were Serbs as well” (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless, just a couple of lines afterwards the author mentions “trials in Split 
where the accused were Croatian army militiamen for crimes against Serbian pri-
soners” (emphasis added). However, the War Crimes Chamber noted the accused’s 
knowledge that victims were protected: 
[t]he fact that among the prisoners there were wounded and civilians, as well as 
the Serbs belonging to the “opposing side” [...] is beyond doubt. However, this 
Court believes [...] that the awareness of the accused and their intent point to the 
fact that those were perceived as the members of the opposing party, prisoners of 
war (as all those who do not acknowledge the perpetration of the offence, as well 
as witnesses heard and witnesses-collaborators used the term “prisoners” in rela-
tion to the injured parties). Hence, bearing also in mind such awareness of the ac-
cused, the Court qualified the act as the offence from Article 144 FRY CC.
Serbian newspapers carefully avoided mentioning the defendants’ nationality, 
whereas the Croatian ones insisted on it. Even if there is a hint about it, it is usually 
put in the form of a witness statement, as in the article published by Blic on Septem-
ber 15th 2005 “Witness: Serbs were killing imprisoned Croatians at Ovčara”. For the 
Serbian media nationality becomes an important issue once the accused half Ser-
bian – half Croat Ivan Atanasijević admits shooting at the prisoners. Titles like “Ad-
mits to have shot Croatian prisoner” (Danas) in perspective of Atanasijević being 
a Croat is not a problem, because it still leaves “clear” the Serbian side. Moreover, 
when the 2005 sentence was revoked suddenly “Croats were not satisfied” (Gra-
djanski list), “Ovčara case made Croats angry” (Blic). 
Even though the Ovčara case was put back on trial, the overall impression is 
that the Trial Chamber with presiding Vesko Krstajić contributed greatly to disman-
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tle ideological narratives about the events in Vukovar. Unfortunately, the indict-
ment did not include JNA commanders or soldiers, but the court was satisfied that 
the army “deliberately left prisoners to the members of TO and paramilitary”. This 
trial triggered precisely the debate over the role of Belgrade in controlling the JNA. 
Almost simultaneously with the beginning of the trial in Belgrade and The Hague 
charges were pressed at Croatian district court, involving some of the JNA ex offi-
cials. During the trial all defendants accused the JNA for organising the massacre at 
Ovčara and described that it was the army that commanded over the TO. Croatian 
media accused JNA officers of exercising “Milosevic’s concept based on mass kill-
ings and ethnic cleansing” (Vjesnik, March 9th). Večernji list also remembers on 
various occasions the JNA General Staff that “initiated the formation of paramili-
tary units and let them make war in Vukovar”. Jutarnji list as well underlines that “a 
number of very high officers that appeared on court as witnesses are clearly respon-
sible for what happened” in Vukovar. Some Serbian newspapers underlined that the 
Ovčara trial was the “first time that direct responsibility of JNA was transferred to 
the Serbian forces in Vukovar” (Dnevnik). The sentence established that the regular 
army of JNA did not take part in the crime at Ovčara and that its members did not 
know that colonel Mrkšić decided to render prisoners of war to the TO. To sum up, 
anonymous members of TO were convicted, the JNA’s responsibility managed to 
disappear and the state continued to escape broader public debate about responsi-
bility in the war. 
Finally, is there a possibility to reach some kind of ideal truth and factual his-
tory? “We will not talk about the causes of war, this should be left to the course of 
history”, underlined judge Krstajić at the end of trial, “what is indisputable is the 
fact that crimes happened at Ovčara”. Nevertheless, this trial marks the process of 
alienation from the long-time official version of “liberation” of Vukovar, to “Vuko-
var conflict”, “operation” and finally “fall of the city”. Even though the indictment 
for the Ovčara crime was really narrow, some background information regarding 
the role of the army and the FRY state were indisputably proven. Dismantling of the 
old ideologies related to the war in Serbia was perhaps best described by defend-
ant Predrag Dragović’s statement: “I feel sorry for the victims and for Serbian hi-
story”. 
Conclusion
The innovative element this project is dealing with is the impact of domestic tri-
bunals for war crimes on the creation of historical narratives. In addition it gives 
a comparative perspective on Croatian and Serbian media reporting on war crime 
trials. The problem of judicial responsibility is tackled on two levels: internation-
al and domestic. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
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(ICTY) provided full compliance of both Serbia and Croatia, but the cooperation 
was made possible only by judicial conditionality performed by the international 
community, mainly the EU. Domestic trials for war crimes offered a very challeng-
ing framework in which the main aims of transitional justice were set apart and po-
litical strategies of denial were put in action. Different ways to deal with proceeding 
for serious breaches of humanitarian law are analysed in depth. 
This research tracks the process of domesticating of the war crime trials. Crimes 
described in detail during the ICTY Vukovar hospital trial were referred to local 
courts: in Ovčara trial part of the material gathered during the investigation process 
was used to indict lower ranked perpetrators. According to the Statute of the ICTY 
the indictees can be accused of crimes against humanity, violations of the laws and 
customs of war, genocide and breaches of the Geneva Convention. Consequently, 
the ICTY gave a broader political and historical context of the war situation as the 
Tribunal builds its cases around the practice of proving a Joint Criminal Enterprise 
and command responsibility. The War Crimes Chamber in Belgrade cannot pro-
secute crimes that were not included in the legislation at the time the crimes were 
committed. At the domestic level, Prosecutions have no incentive to examine the 
context as they do not need to prove systematic violations of humanitarian law, but 
concentrate separately on each single crime. In those circumstances, the truth-tell-
ing capacity of the domestic war crime trials is extremely limited.
This research compares notions of collective and individual responsibility, guilt 
and accountability and their relation with new political ideologies. Even though the 
ICTY’s jurisprudence can establish only individual guilt, the defendants rather in-
sist on collective guilt when accusing The Hague Tribunal. The reasoning again 
derives from the attempt to discredit international humanitarian law’s possibility 
to pursue command responsibility and by extension, general responsibility. On the 
other hand, the accused at domestic courts carry no political weight and belong 
mostly to paramilitary formations outside the official army. Nevertheless, recent 
trials for war crimes in both Serbia and Croatia see former military officers accused 
for wrongdoings and there is a change in tone of the reports through time.
Ostojić argues that it is “the pacification of the domestic political scene and 
the strengthening of democratic institutions that gradually improved prospects for 
establishing accountability” (Ostojić, 2011). This research supports the hypothesis 
that post-conflict societies accepted consequences of past atrocities, but still did 
not take full responsibility for the crimes committed. Instead, twenty years of in-
strumental denial and subsequently little or no interest for dealing with the past 
“cleared” the terrain for more objective and fair trials. In addition, historical know-
ledge and continuity with the past is broken in attempt to create a new political com-
munity, cleared of past wrongdoings.
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In Serbia, war crime trials persist to be a minor topic in the public sphere. There 
is a great deal of silencing and auto-censure about the nature of the war itself that 
balances between “possible responsibility for war” and “responsibility of the other 
party” and therefore trials are represented mostly in a very technical, seemingly ob-
jective manner. On the other hand, Croatian identity is strongly connected to the 
Homeland War and crimes are understood mostly as legitimate defence. Scholars like 
Peskin and Subotić explain the scarce response to transitional justice mechanisms by 
the power balance between nationalistic and liberal political elites and model their 
identity and behaviour. This research’s thesis is that instead of triggering truth-seek-
ing and truth-telling processes that would lead to reconciliation, the focus on war 
crimes has multiplied the mutually exclusive historical narratives that are increa-
singly determining national collective identities. Politics of interpretative denial does 
not deny “the raw facts; rather, they are given a different meaning from what seems 
apparent to others” (Cohen, 2001). War crimes and legal heritage hence become con-
sciously distant. In addition, general argument for not dealing with the past is a fragi-
lity of newly established democracy of countries in transition from conflict.
Artificially isolated question of transitional justice and democratic transition 
justified no apparent need for systematic dealing with the past. The ICTY trials have 
lifted away any kind of denial of committed crimes. Nevertheless, there is little pub-
lic interest in domestic war crime trials due to the fact that the democratic transition 
was conducted separately and with no mean of connecting issues of dealing with 
past wrongdoings with the regime transition. Still, transitional justice helped judi-
cial reform and rule of law practices, but only once the democratic consolidation 
process had already started. Compliance with the ICTY was managed with great 
democratic deficit as political elites acted upon conditionality dictate. Nevertheless, 
the continuous process of collecting “judicial truths” through domestic war crime 
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